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NOTES

775. Article 77529 specifies those situations in which a mistrial
may be declared without breaching the guarantee against double
jeopardy. These situations are essentially the same as those
which the United States Supreme Court has traditionally held
to justify the declaration of a mistrial without the defendant's
consent. In light of the restricted interpretation of "manifest
necessity" applied in Jorn, article 775 should cover virtually
every situation in which a mistrial can validly be declared.30 It
should be noted, however, that article 775 must necessarily be
read in light of the "manifest necessity" requirement of Jorn, the
latter obviously controlling should there be a conflict between
the two.
Carl Grant Schlueter
APPLICABILITY OF ARTICLE 1592 TO THE STATUTORY WILL

A statutory will, which named the plaintiff the universal
legatee, was declared formally invalid on the ground that the
plaintiff had acted as one of the two attesting witnesses, contrary
29. Id. art. 775: "A mistrial may be ordered, and in a jury case the jury
dismissed, when:
"(1) The defendant consents thereto;
"(2) The jury is unable to agree upon a verdict;
"(3) There is a legal defect in the proceedings which would make any
judgment entered upon a verdict reversible as a matter of law;
"(4) The court finds that the defendant does not have the mental capacity to proceed;
"(5) It is physically Impossible to proceed with the trial in conformity
with law; or
"(6) False statements of a juror on voir dire prevent a fair trial.
"Upon motion of a defendant, a mistrial shall be ordered, and in a jury
case the jury dismissed, when prejudical conduct in or outside the courtroom
makes it impossible for the defendant to obtain a fair trial, or when authorized by Article 770 or 771.
"A mistrial shall be ordered, and in a jury case the jury dismissed, when
the state and the defendant jointly move for a mistrial."
30. The categories of article 775 provide certainty in the existing guidelines as to ordering a mistrial, but the inflexible nature of this article may
pose problems. One such problem is that it is impossible to define all of the
circumstances in which it may become necessary to declare a mistrial without the consent of the defendant. Thus there may arise situations in which
it would be advisable to declare a mistrial without the defendant's consent,
yet which may not fit into any of the circumstances listed in Article 775. In
such an event a mistrial would be invalid under article 775, and article 591
would preclude retrial for the offense.
One such situation which article 775 would not cover is when a mistrial
must be declared without the defendant's consent due to prejudicial conduct within or without the courtroom. It is well settled that bias and prejudicial conduct may justify a mistrial in certain circumstances, yet article
775 states that such a mistrial may be declared only upon motion of the
defendant.
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to Louisiana Civil Code article 1592.1 The plaintiff did not appeal
from this judgment but subsequently brought suit for damages
against the attorney who had confected the will. The district
court dismissed the suit on exception of no cause of action. In
remanding the case, the Court of Appeal for the Fourth Circuit
held, article 1592 does not apply to statutory wills, and the will
was therefore valid. Woodfork v. Sanders, 248 So.2d 419 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 252 So.2d 455.
The Civil Code of 1870 presents an integrated scheme by
which all dispositions mortis causa are to be governed. This
scheme charts rules of general applicability representing public
policy considerations pertinent to testamentary dispositions 2 and,
more explicitly, enumerates the formal requirements for each
of the four types of wills established therein.8 Included in the
general rules are the articles which create attestative incapacities
for certain groups of persons, i.e., disqualifications which affect
them without regard to the type of testament they seek to witness. 4 Article 1592, read together with the exception contained
in article 1593 concerning mystic testaments, establishes the sole
relative incapacity with regard to attestation. 5
The purposes of requiring witnesses to a will are both to assure faithful compliance with the legal requisites and to have
available, if necessary, persons capable of testifying as to what
transpired in their presence." In pursuance of these policy goals,
the Louisiana courts gave early recognition to the importance
of maintaining the standards of attestative competence prescribed
1. LA. Civ. CODE art. 1592 provides: "Neither can testaments be witnessed
by those who are constituted heirs or named legatees, under whatsoever title

it may be."
2. See, e.g., id. arts. 1572, 1573, 1595.
3. Id. arts 1574-1589. See Note, 15 LOYOLA L. REV. 362 (1969).
4. LA. CIV. CODE arts.
1591-1593.
5. 21 DEMOLOMBE, COURS DE CODE NAPOL]ON, TRAiTf DES DONATIONS ENTREVIFS ET DES TESTAMENTS IV,
n- 198 (1878).
6. 3 AUBRY ET RAU, CIVIL LAW TRANSLATIONS no. 670 (La. St. L. Inst.
transl.

1969). That witnesses to the statutory will are expected to fulfill substantive
duties is indicated by LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 2887, which concerns probate pro-

cedures. Under its provisions, the available witnesses are required to swear
to the fact of signature by the testator. Moreover, the importance of attestative witnesses under the statutory scheme has recently been recognized in
Succession of Reeves, 224 So.2d 502, 504 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969): "We conclude, therefore, that the principal function of the witnesses is to provide

a source of proof that the testator signed what he formally indicated to be
his testament." (Court's emphasis.)
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by the Code.7 Strict observance of article 1592 has seemed especially advisable in view of the inadmissability of proof of cap8
tation in an action to void a testamentary disposition.
Articles 1591-1593 must be read, however, as exceptions to
9
the general rule of full capacity declared by the Code. For this
0
reason the courts have applied them with great circumspection.'
Exemplary of the narrowness with which they have been interpreted is the judicial construction of article 1592, whose ban
the courts have refused to extend so as to include relatives of
the legatee." Furthermore, the jurisprudence is to the effect that
the mere presence of the legatee at the confection of the will
12
does not, for that reason alone, render it null.
In 1952, a new type of will, enacted as R.S. 9:2442-2443, was
injected into Louisiana's self-contained plan of testamentary
order. The so-called statutory will, which traces its origin to the
English Statute of Frauds of 1677,13 introduced into Louisiana a
14
Regret has
simplified procedure for drawing up a testament.
explicitly
made
not
was
will
of
type
new
the
that
expressed
been
5
Supreme
Louisiana
the
subject to the Code's regime;' however,
Court had indicated in at least one instance that, where the stat7. See Hebert's Heirs v. Hebert's Legatees, 11 La. 361, 865 (1837): "This
wise precaution, and strongest barrier which the law interposes for the protection of the testator, would be vain and nugatory if the witnesses were
incompetent to the trust they were called to fulfill."
8. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1492 provides: "Proof is not admitted of the dispositions having been made through hatred, anger, suggestion or captation."
See Succession of Hernandez, 138 La. 134, 70 So. 63 (1915); Comment, 34
TUL. L. REV. 585 (1960).
9. LA. CIv. CODE art. 25 provides: "Men and women are capable of all
kinds of engagements and functions, except where the law declares to the
contrary, and unless disqualified by reasons and causes applying to particular individuals."
10. See, e.g., Succession of Koerkel, 226 La. 560, 76 So.2d 730 (1954); Keller
v. McCalop, 12 Rob. 639 (La. 1846).
11. Segur's Heirs v. Segur, 12 La. 25 (1838).
12. Succession of Guglielmo, 158 La. 917, 105 So. 12 (1925).
13. Comment, 28 TUL. L. REV. 288 (1954).
14. See Succession of Morgan, 257 La. 380, 385, 242 So.2d 551, 552 (1970);
"A primary purpose of our statute authorizing this type of will is to afford
another and simplified means of making a testament whereby the authenticity of the act can be readily ascertained . . .. "
15. Louisiana Legislation of 1952, 13 LA. L. Rsv. 21, 33 (1952): "It Is both
unexpected and unfortunate that this legislation was not enacted as an
amendment or addition to the Civil Code, which contains the other methods
for making a will and the body of rules governing these methods."
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ute was silent, specific articles of the Civil Code-in that case
the very article 1592-would be applicable. 0
Nonetheless, the statutory will suffers from an ambiguity
born of extraneousness. Underscoring this defect is a recent decision, Succession of Gordon,17 in which the Louisiana Supreme
Court hesitantly indicated that common law sources are to serve
as guides in the interpretation of R.S. 9: 2442-2443.1s The language
of the opinion carries with it the potential effect, if not the intention, of liberating the statutory will from firm moorings in
either body of law.
Indeed, such was the effect when the court in the instant
case cited Gordon in support of the contention that a statutory
will can be declared invalid only if an explicit commandment of
R.S. 9:2442-2443 is violated. The court emphasized the language
of R.S. 9:244219 in concluding that the legislative intent was to
preclude the requirement of any formalities other than those
expressly stated within the statute itself. The court indicated
that, because article 1592 would impose an additional formality
on the statutory will, its application to the instant case would be
impossible. 2° Such an argument, however, ignores the distinction, long recognized in Louisiana jurisprudence, 2' between rules
of formality and those of capacity.2 2 The language of R.S. 9:2442,
explicitly addressed to form alone,23 is clearly inapposite to the
question of attestative capacity and thus cannot support the
court's conclusion. Furthermore, by declaring the statute's independence from code provisions in a matter not pertaining to
16. Succession of Eck, 233 La. 764, 774, 98 So.2d 181, 185 (1957). The opinion
is praised in Oppenheim, The Testate Succession, 36 TUL. L. REV. 1, 14 (1961):
"The court quite correctly integrated the statutory will into the Civil Code
in this matter instead of attempting to set forth the qualifications of the
attesting witnesses."
17. 257 La. 1086, 245 So.2d 319 (1971).
18. Id. at 1092, 245 So.2d at 321.
19. Woodfork v. Sanders, 248 So.2d 419, 423 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1971),
quoting from LA. R.S. 9:2442 (Supp. 1952): "'In addition to the methods
provided in the Louisiana Civil Code, a will shall be valid It' the statute's
requirements are met." (Court's emphasis.)
20. Id. at 424.
21. See Succession of Murray, 41 La. Ann. 1109, 1116, 7 So. 126, 129 (1889):
"Article 1591 is in the same category, and it is clear to our minds that it
does not specify any formality to which testaments are subject, but simply
declares what persons are absolutely incapable of being witnesses to testaments, in general."
22. A general discussion of capacity and formality and their respective
roles in civilian theory is found in S. LrrviNoFs & W. TfTo, LOUiSIANA LEGAL
TRANSACTIONS: THE CIVIL LAW OF JURIDICAL ACTS (1969).
23. LA. R.S. 9:2442 (Supp. 1952) is entitled "Statutory will; form."
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form alone, the court casts doubt on whether any of the other
Civil Code rules expressive of public policy with regard to testaments are applicable to the statutory will.
A second argument advanced by the court is that, because
of the parallel between the mystic and the statutory will, the
latter comes within the exception to article 1592 established by
article 1593.24 What makes the two types of wills so analogous
is never properly demonstrated by the court. Although the
statutory will need not be read aloud before the witnesses, it
certainly does not follow that knowledge of the contents will, or
can, be kept from either the notary or the witnesses. Thus, secrecy, which is the basis for the exception in favor of the mystic
testament, 25 is not an essential element of the statutory will;
therefore, article 1593 should not be extended to apply to the
instant case on this basis alone.
The court mentioned, but did not develop, the notion that
the legislature, by amending R.S. 9:2443 in 1964,26 intended to
establish the inability to read or to sign one's name as the sole
cause, to the exclusion of the Code's regime, for disqualification
of witnesses. By invoking this proposition, the court was able to
circumvent the earlier decisions to the contrary,27 both of which
concerned testaments drawn up before 1964. It is doubtful, however, that the legislature would express so indirectly an intent
to overrule the jurisprudence in such an important matter. At
the time of amendment it was thought that its purpose was to
overrule a line of decisions unrelated to the instant case,2 8 and,
after 1964, at least one author expressed the belief that the code
provisions would be fully applicable to the statutory will.29
Moreover, in assessing the legislative intent, it is well to remember that article 1592 is similarly modified in the Civil Code by
24. LA. Cry. CODE art. 1593: "Mystic testaments are excepted from the
preceding article."
25. 3 PLANIOL, Crvim LAw TRzABSS no. 2722 (La. St. L. Inst. transl. 1959):
"Since the content of the will is secret, the notary has no means how to
know the legatees or their relatives, and how to prevent them from witnessing."
26. LA. R.S. 9:2443 (Supp. 1952), as amended: "[T]hose who know not
how or are not able to sign their names, and those who know not how or
are not able to read, cannot ... be attesting witnesses thereto."
27. Succession of Eck, 233 La. 764, 98 So.2d 181 (1957); Succession of
Hackett, 187 So.2d 485 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966).
28. Louisiana Legislation of 1964-Successions and Donations, 25 LA. L.
REV. 18, 20 (1964).

29. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1965-1966 TermSuccessions and Donations, 27 A. L. REV. 442, 444 (1967).
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requirements that a certain number of the attesting witnesses
be able to sign their names, the number being tailored to the
type of will.8 0 The additional requirements do not exclude application of article 1592 to testaments governed by the Civil Code,
so it may well be doubted that the amendment should be construed as having that effect with regard to statutory wills.
The court advanced each of the arguments discussed above
but neglected to mention on which of the three it based its holding. Although none of the lines of reasoning seems adequate to
justify the decision, the court may reasonably have concluded
that its result was in accordance with a liberal interpretation
of the statutory will. Nonetheless, the decision is regrettable in
that it denies effect to an important safeguard for the proper
confection of testaments and casts doubt on the applicability of
the Civil Code's scheme to the statutory will.
W. Marshall Shaw
AN UNLOADED AND UNWORKABLE PISTOL AS A DANGEROUS
WEAPON WHEN USED IN A ROBBERY
The defendant was charged with armed robbery. While
conceding that the revolver he used in the robbery was unloaded
and not capable of being fired, the state argued that it was
nevertheless a dangerous weapon. In affirming the conviction,
the supreme court held, one who commits robbery by pointing
an unloaded and unworkable pistol' at the victim can be found
guilty of armed robbery. State v. Levi, 250 So.2d 751 (La. 1971).
R.S. 14:64(A) defines armed robbery as "the theft of anything of value . . . while armed with a dangerous weapon."'2 A
dangerous weapon is defined in R.S. 14:2(3) as any "instrumentality, which, in the manner used, is calculated or likely to
produce death or great bodily harm."
In the instant case the supreme court has, for the first time,
interpreted R.S. 14:2(3) 4 in relation to the commission of an
30. LA. Civ. CODH arts. 1580, 1582, 1587.
1. The court in reaching the decision makes no distinction between

a

gun which is unloaded and one which is unworkable, but rather treats these
conditions as being equivalent. The courts of other states have handled
this problem In a similar manner. See note 11 infra.
2. LA. R.S. 14:64 (1950).
3. Id.
4. Id.

14:2(3).

